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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE
Appeal from a decision denying defendant's motion to
dismiss and his conviction on the charge of issuing checks
against insufficient funds.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

I
\

\

(
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Defendant-Appellant was tried and convicted of the
crime of issuing checks against insufficient funds. Defendant's
trial and motion to dismiss were conducted before the
-1-

__,,,,.

I
Honorable John F. Wahlquist in the Second Judicial District
Sentence was imposed for a term of not more than
five years and the Defendant is now in the Utah State Pris on.

'
J

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Appellant respectfully requests the Court
to set aside his conviction on the grounds that he had pre.
viously been placed in jeopardy and punished for the same
offense.

I

It is alleged that between July 22 and August 16,
1971, a period of less than four weeks, defendant wrote seven
checks, drawn on his checking account at Walker Bank, Ogden,
Utah, and payable to three Ogden businesses. It is further
alleged that these seven checks were each returned to the
payee for lack of sufficient funds. The date, amount, and
payee of each check are as follows:
$100.00
75.00
93.64
106.15
93.95
97.52
73.63

K-Mart
K-Mart
Gibson's
Gibson's
Gibson's
Gibson's
Lafayette
Electronics

The total amount of these checks is $638.89.
On the 24th day of August, 1971, defendant was
charged with violating Section 76-20-11(2) (b), Utah
Annotated 1953 as amended, a felony. This charge was base
'
'
· d to
upon the two checks of July 22 and August 8, 1971,tssue
K-Mart, in the amounts listed above. (R.102)
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STATEMENT OF FACTS

7-22-71
8-3-71
8-11-71
8-14-71
8-15-71
8-15-71
8-16-71

,

-

[

1

On the 25th day of August, 1971, defendant was
charged with violating Section 76-20-11(2) (b), Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended, a felony. This charge was based
upon the four checks of August 11, 14, 15 and 15, 1971,
issued to Gibson's, and in the amounts listed above. (R.1)
On the 10th day of September, 1971, defendant was
charged with violating Section 76-20-11(2) (a), Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended, a misdemeanor. This charge
was based upon the check of August 16, 1971, issued to
Lafayette Electronics in the amount of $72.63. (R.217)

.
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On September 14, 1971, preliminary hearings were
held on the two felony charges in the City Court of Ogden,
Utah, before Charles H. Sneddon, Judge of said Court.
Defendant was represented by appointed counsel and was
ordered held to stand trial upon the offenses charged. (R.4)
Later on that same date, defendant was called before the same
Court on the misdemeanor charge. After defendant's request
for appointment of counsel had been denied by the court, the
case was continued until September 17, 1971. At that time,
the defendant, without advice of counsel, entered a plea of
guilty to said charge, and was sentenced by the court to
ninety days in jail. (R. 219) Neither of defendant's attorneys,
appointed to represent him on the felony charges, had been
advised of the existence of the misdemeanor. The prosecutor
at both hearings was L. Kent Bachman, Assistant County
Attorney for Weber County. The defendant was brought to
trial and convicted on April 11, 1972, upon an amended information (R.44) which combined the two felony charges as
required by the District Court in its Memorandum Decision
(R.42). The defendant was sentenced to imprisonment in the
Utah State Prison for a term not to exceed five years. (R.86)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
IF SECTION 76-20-11(2), UTAH CODE ANNOTA-

TED, 19 53, AS AMENDED, BE CONSTRUED AS DEFINING
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A SERIES OF CHECKS ISSUED AGAINST INSUFFICJENJ
FUNDS AS ONE CRIME, THEN FURTHER
OR PUNISHMENT OF THE DEFENDANT, AFTER A CON
VICTION BASED UPON ONE CHECK IN THE SAM!
SERIES, WOULD BE BARRED BY THE PROHIBITim
AGAINST MULTIPLE PUNISHMENTS EMBODIED Ji\
SECTION 76-1-23, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953;BY
AR TI CLE I, SECTION 12, OF THE CONSTITUTION Of
UT AH: AND BY AMENDMENT V OF THE
OF THE UNITED STATES, MADE APPLICABLE TO THI
SEVERAL STATES BY AMENDMENT XIV OF THAT
CONSTITUTION.
The language of Article I § 12 of the Constitution ol
Utah and of Amendment V of the Constitution of the United
States is substantially the same in stating that no person shau
twice be put in jeopardy for the same offense. The troublesom1
language in both Constitutions is "same offense." Variom
courts have at various times defined these words in terms of
the evidence required or available to support each charge.
v. !:!aili; 443 F. 2d 1295 (9th Circuit 1971). This is the
construction which the state seems to use in its memorandurn
to the Second District Court. (R.32) More recently man)
courts have considered the issue as being whether or not the
charges are based upon the same acts or same transaction.
In Ashe v. Swenso!_!, 397 U. S. 436, 25 L.Ed. 2d 469 (1970)
the-United state;Supreme Court also considered the problem
as being one of whether or not the same factual issues were
involved in both charges. In his concurring opinion, Justice
Brennan discussed the "same evidence" and "same transaction"
tests, pointing out that the popular "same evidence" test had
never been held by the Court to be the required construct10n
of the words "same offense" and that the Court had in fact re·
jected that test in cases. involving multiple trials. In support of
a preference for a test based upon the same act, occurrance.
episode, or transaction, Justice Brennan pointed out that
the American Law Institute and the Courts of the Unite
Kingdom have adopted this approach and expressly rejected
the evidentiary standard.

-4-

The State has also stated in its memorandum (R.32)
that the defendant would have committed only one crime had
there been but one victim rather than three. This contention
involves questions of statuatory interpretation as well as constitutional construction, but any such contention flies squarely
in the face of
supra. In that case the defendant had been
tried and acquitted of the robbery of one of six victims in the
group. The defendant was then convicted of robbing another
person in that same group. This second prosecution was held
by the Court to constitute double jeopardy. Mere multiplicity
of victims does not avoid the double jeopardy prohibitions of
the Utah and United States Constitutions.
In his memorandum decision on the defendant's
Motion to Dismiss, Judge John F. Wahlquist of the Second
Judicial District Court stated that defendant had not been in
jeopardy of a felony as his misdemeanor conviction for this
offense had been in the City Court of Ogden City, a court
which lacked jurisdiction of the felony. (R.42) The position
set out in this opinion is exactly that relied upon by the State
of Florida in Waller v. Florida, 397, U.S. 387, 25 L.Ed.2d
435, 90 S.Ct. ll84(1970JPetition for rehearing denied May
18, 1970, 398 U.S. 914, 26 L.Ed. 79, 90 S.Ct. 1984. The Supreme Court of the United States unanimously rejected that
position. ln its opinion by Chief Justice Burger, the Court held
that municipalities are not separate sovereigns from their states,
but are arms of their state. The Court stated, therefore, that a
state felony charge based on the same acts as an earlier misdemeanor charge brought in a municipal court is barred by the
action in the municipal court despite the municipal court's
lack of jurisdiction to entertain felony charges.
Moreover, Section 76-1-23, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, provides:
"An act or om1ss1on which is made punishable by
different provisions of this Code may be punished by
any one of such provisions, but in no case can it be
punished under more than one; an acquittal or
conviction under any one bars a prosecution for the
same act or omission under any other."

-5-

.....,
Thus it is clear that any further prosecution or punishmentoi
the defendant based upon checks in the same series as ache I
f or which the defendant has already been punished is barred.c

POINT II
IF SECTION 76-20-11(2), UTAH CODE ANNOTAl
ED, 1953, AS AMENDED, BE CONSTRUED AS REQUIR
ING THAT A SERIES OF CHECKS AS DEFINED BY THAT
STATUTE BE PROSECUTED AS A SINGLE OFFENSE.
THEN THE DEFENDANT HAS TWICE BEEN PLACED
JEOPARDY FOR THE SAME OFFENSE. IF THAT STAT
UTE BE INTERPRETED AS PERMITTING BUT NOT
REQUIRING SUCH A PROSECUTION, THEN THE STATUTE IS VOID UNDER THE PRINCIPLES SET FORTH IN
V.
453 P.2d. 146 (UTAH, 1969).
Section 76-20-11(2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953,as
amended, provides a statuatory scheme for punishment depending on the dollar amount of all instruments involved. The
three segments of this system are as follows:
( 2) Penalties for violating any provision of subsection ( 1) of this section shall be as follows:
(a) If such check, draft, or order of a series of the
same made or drawn in this state within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum not more than $100.00, then
a fine of not more than $299.00 or imprisonment in the
county jail for not more than six months, or both.
(b) If such check, draft, or order or a series of the
same made or drawn in this state within a period not exceed·
ing six months amounts to a sum exceeding $100.00, but not
$2,500.00, then a fine of not more than $5,000.00 or
imprisonment in the state prison for not more than five years.
or both.

· 0 f the
.
(c) If such check, draft, or order or a series
·
h'
·
h'
·
d
ot
exceeding
same ma d e or d rawn mt is state wit m a peno n
"
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six months amounts to a sum exceeding $2,500.00, then a
fine of not more than $10,000.00 or imprisonment in the
state prison for not more than ten years, or both.
The difficult language in this statute is the phrase "check,
draft, or order, or a series of the same."
(Emphasis added)
It is clear from the statute that one check, draft, or order is
sufficient to invoke punishment within the statuatory framework; it is less clear how a "series of the same" is to be treated.
There are several possible interpretations of this
phrase. The words "check or series" may be taken as being
mutually exclusive. Such would be the plain meaning of the
statute and would require that, at least where the prosecution
is aware of the existence of more than one check, all checks
in the series be charged and punished as one offense. Under
this interpretation, all seven of the defendant's checks should
have been charged in one information and the defendant
would have been punished under subsection (b) - the "lesser
felony" provision - as the total dollar amount of the checks
is more than $100.00, but less than $2,500.00. Moreover,
under this interpretation, defendant's conviction based on one
check in the series would bar further prosecution based on
other checks in the same series as the state was fully aware of
the existence of the other checks prior to that first conviction.
A second appraoch to the problem presented by this
phraseology is that used, most notably, by the California
Courts. In their memorandum to the Second Judicial District
Court, both the State and the defense discuss several such
decisions. It is important, however, to recall that we are dealing here with the construction of a Utah statute, not with a
problem in a general area of law cqmmon to all jurisdictions.
Thus, these decisions from sister states are helpful 2-!!b'. to the
extent that the statutes construed are analogous. Thus, while
the relevant California cases have dealt with a similar
statuatory framework for punishment, the statute involved
does not pose the "check or series" problem. California
Penal Code §4 76a provides that a check drawn against insufficient funds is a felony unless the total amount of all checks
-7-

does not exceed a certain dollar value, in which case it is
misdemeanor. (Note - in some of the cited cases the dolla;
amount of the statute is $50.00, others arose after the amounr
had been raised to $100.00.) The Utah statute defines a serie
as any number of checks issued within a period of six monrn,
Only the extent of punishment depends on the dollar valueoi
the checks. However, as all of the defendant's checks come
within the statuatory six-month period, we need pay nn
further consideration to this part of the definition. Tne
punishment provisions of the California statute would, there
fore, seem to bear sufficient resemblence to the Utan
statute, so as to make the California decisions as appropriate
analogy.
In interpreting the punishment section of the Califor
nia statute, the California Courts have determined that once
the dollar value of a series of checks exceeds the maximum
prescribed for a lesser punishment, the greater punishment is
invoked. This greater punishment is but one punishment for
all of the checks which, when totalled, invoke that greater
punishment. Any checks written after that point begin anew
to work their way through the statuatory scheme. Peo_p_k v.
Q.!:!_sstella, 44 Cal. Rptr, 678 (Cal.Ct. of Appeals 1965).
An illustrative case is In re Dick, 411 P.2d 561, Cal.,
1966. In that case the defenda;;; had issued several checks and
had been convicted of seven felonies. At that time, the Calif.
ornia statute prescribed that if the amount of the checks did
not exceed $50.00, the punishment was as for a misdemeanor.
It is important to remember at this point that the California
statute sets out a two-stage system for punishment while the
Utah system is in three stages. Therefore, all analogies apply
to both the misdeameanor and "lesser felony" provisions of
the Utah statute. In considering the petitioner's situation, the
Dick Court divided the checks chronologically into two series
Th;first series was com piled until the total dollar limit of the
punishment statute was exceeded; at this point the Court
determined that the greater punishment had been rnvoked.
The court then began anew with the remaining checks; as
their total was less than fifty dollars, the court determined
-8-

that the lesser penalty would be applied as to that series. The
court pointed out that the statute sets the aggregate amount
which " ... may be issued without incurring increased criminal
responsibility." Qifk, supra, 563. Echoing
supra, the
court stated that once this limit had been reached " ... his
issuance of further ... checks or a series of checks must be
deemed ... as in the case of an original wrongdoer." Dick,
supra, 564. The court treated the provisions for escalating
punishment as amelioraty so that doubts as to its effect must
be resolved in favor of the wrongdoer. _QifJs supra, 563.
Had the prosecution in the instant case applied the
California analogy to the defendant's situation, the seven
checks would have been totalled and, reaching less than
$2,500.00, the defendant would have been charged with one
felony and punished under Section 76-20-11(2) (b), the socalled "lesser felony" provision. Had the total dollar amount
exceeded $2,500.00, then the checks would have been totalled
until they reached that amount, the greater punishment would
have been imposed, and all remaining checks would have been
treated as a separate series.
This interpretation of the Utah statute, however,
requires us to add another factor to our definition of "series;"
that of dollar amount. Where the dollar amount exceeds
$2,500.00, the Utah statute would seem to consider that only
one punishment may be imposed
of the dollar
amount. Thus, if we adopt the California approach, we avoid
one objection the state raises to reqmrmg a series to be
treated as one act for the purpose of punishment.
The state's contention that a series be defined as
having a common victim is untenable and seems to result from
a confusion with cases involving double jeopardy and the same
evidence test. Obviously, the same evidence test or any other
test of double jeopardy is not relevant in determining statuatory construction. Many states have no such punishment
scheme requiring or permitting the totalling of checks but
punish each check as a separate offense even where more than
one check is given the same victim. Such a statute raises no
problem of double jeopardy and the defendant would not be
-9-

here on appeal were that the Utah statute. It is not. Moreover
such an interpretation would emasculate the statute in that
the accelerating punishment provisions would then not appJ,
to the "professional paper-hanger." It must be doubted
the state would seriously contend that one who had issued
ten checks to ten different persons, the total of such chech
being more than $2,500.00, could not be given the maximum
punishment under the statute. Moreover, this view seems to
have been rejected by the District Court in its memorandum
decision.
Yet another approach to the punishment statue is one
which would permit the state to prosecute a series of chech
either as a series or as individual crimes, at the election of the
State. This interpretation is the only one which would allm1
the defendant's subsequent conviction to stand. The defense
contends, however, that this interpretation would render the
statute void for vagueness. Were the state to be able to choose
between series and individual prosecution or, as here, between
part series and part individual, then each case involving more
than one check could be punished in a horrifying number ol
ways. For example, two checks totalling less than $100.00
could be punished either as one misdemeanor or two; two
checks each in excess of $100.00, as one "lesser" felony or as
two. When one considers a situation such as that here, with
seven checks, the potential for prosecutorial abuse truly becomes frightening. If all checks are treated individually, the
defendant could be punished for six misdemeanors and one
"lesser" felony. By combining the checks into a single series
the defendant may be punished for only one such felony.
Partial combination resulted here in one "lesser" felony and
one misdemeanor; if this action of the state is upheld, then
any combination or lack thereof, with any number and kind
of punishment, would also be acceptable.
This interpretation would allow such uncertainty oi
punishment as to invoke the prohibition against
application of the laws contained in Amendment XIV, §1, 01
the United States Constitution and Article I, §24 of the
Constitution of Utah.
-10-

5_t;gte v. _S_hondel, 22 Utah 2d. 343, 453 P.2d. 146
(J 969) is directly addressed to this issue. In that case, this
court pointed out that equal protection of the laws requires
that the law affect alike all persons in the same situation.
C:learly, the interpretation discussed here would permit a
completely different prosecution of a person in a situation
identical to that of the defendant. From that same opinion,
and precisely on point, is the statement summing up a clear
and ancient legal principle: " ... a penal statute should be
similarly clear, specific, and understandable as to the penalty
imposed for its violation." Where a statute fails to meet this
standard, it must be considered as either too vague to be
capable of application or violative of the guarantee of equal
protection.
v.
368, U. S. 488, 7 L.Ed. 2d, 446
82 S.Ct. 501 (1962).
It is the contention of the defense, therefore, that only
the first two interpretations of this statute are acceptable.
Either a series of checks is punishable as one offense regardless
of dollar amount, but to an extent determined by the dollar
amount or that a series is defined not only in terms of time,
but also in terms of dollar amount - the California approach.
Under either of these interpretations, the State must prosecute
a series as a single entity at least where it has or should have
knowledge of the existence of the other checks. Kellett v.
409 P. 2d 206, 48 Cal.
Rptr. 366 (1966). Also, under either of these interpretations,
the defendant has already been placed in jeopardy and
punished by his conviction based upon one check in the series.

-11-

CONCLUSION
The defendant-appellant has twice been placed
jeopardy and is being twice punished by his prosecution basei!
upon checks in the same series as the check upon which hE
prior conviction had been based. The statute under which tht
defendant is being punished either restricts the State to om
prosecution for one series of checks or else is unconstitution
ally vague as to the punishment to be imposed. His conviction
must be set aside.

Respectfully submitted,
JOHN BLAIR HUTCHISON
Attorney for Defendant and
Appellant
818 - 26th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401

